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NOTE
STAPLED STOCK AND I.R.C. SECTION 269B:
ILL-CONCEIVED CHANGE IN THE RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL TAX JURISDICTION
Domestic corporations with significant overseas business em-
ploy stapled stock arrangements' to escape United States taxation of
income earned abroad. The domestic corporation avoids this tax
liability by incorporating its foreign operations in a foreign tax ha-
ven2 and then widely dispersing ownership of the new foreign cor-
poration among its own shareholders through a stock-on-stock
dividend. Foreign corporations with widely held stock fall outside
the United States's tax jurisdiction. To retain a close beneficial rela-
tionship with the new foreign corporation, the domestic corporation
"staples" or "pairs" its own stock with the newly issued stock of the
foreign corporation. The pairing arrangement restricts subsequent
stock transfers to ensure that ownership in the foreign corporation
passes only with a fixed ratio of ownership in the domestic corpora-
tion. Consequently, the same shareholders own both corporations,
and presumably will continue to operate the companies in a mutu-
ally beneficial manner.
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984,3 Congress added sec-
tion 269B 4 to the Internal Revenue Code in an effort to increase
revenue collection by ending the abusive use of stapled stock. Sec-
tion 269B extends United States tax jurisdiction to include other-
wise nontaxable foreign corporations that are paired with domestic
entities and unilaterally overrides all United States tax treaty provi-
sions that might shield foreign corporations from direct United
States tax jurisdiction. The shortsighted solution offered by section
269B represents an unprecedented expansion of United States tax
jurisdiction and fails to conform with international standards of tax
1 Stapled stock arrangements exist where one independent corporation "staples"
or "pairs" its stock to that of a second independent corporation. Hence, any future
transfer of an interest in one corporation triggers a simultaneous transfer of an interest
in the second corporation.
2 For the purpose of this Note, a tax haven is a jurisdiction that taxes types and
levels of income at a lower rate than that of the United States. For a description of other
characteristics typically associated with tax havens and a list of such jurisdictions, see
generally B. Sprrz, TAX HAVENS ENCYCLOPAEDIA (1975).
3 The Tax Reform Act of 1984 is contained in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494.
4 I.R.C. § 269B (Supp. II 1984).
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jurisdiction. Moreover, the treaty override provisions jeopardize
the future viability and cooperative enforcement of United States
tax treaties. Instead, Congress should close the stapled stock loop-
hole by treating stapled foreign corporations as fully owned subsidi-
aries of their domestic counterparts and ignore the distribution of
stapled foreign corporations' ownership among many individual
shareholders.
I
BACKGROUND
A. United States Tax Jurisdiction
The United States employs three independent bases for assert-
ing tax jurisdiction: citizenship, residency, and geographic location.
The interaction of these three bases of jurisdiction often creates
double taxation through the overlap of the United States and for-
eign tax jurisdictions. Bilateral tax treaties partially mitigate double
taxation's harmful effects. Except for the due process clause, which
proscribes arbitrary taxation, 5 no constitutional provision 6 or inter-
national law7 restricts the scope of United States tax jurisdiction.
Instead jurisdictional limits within the Internal Revenue Code are
the product of compromise, convenience, and politics.8
The current bases for exerting United States jurisdiction paral-
lel in personam and in rem jurisdiction.9 Jurisdiction over the per-
son for tax purposes stems from United States residence or
citizenship,' 0 and jurisdiction over a transaction or property arises
from existence of the res within the United States's geographic lim-
5 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915) (for tax to violate fifth
amendment due process clause, government must have acted in fashion "so arbitrary
... that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property").
6 The scope of "power to lay and collect taxes" delegated to Congress by art. I,
§ 8 of the Constitution covers "every conceivable power of taxation." 240 U.S. at 12.
The sixteenth amendment did not augment Congress's power to tax, but instead elimi-
nated the requirement that direct taxes be apportioned among the states. Id. at 17-18.
See I J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 4.01 (rev. ed. 1981); 1 R.
RHOADES & M. LANGER, INCOME TAXATON OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS § 1. 11
(1985).
7 Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933) (United States could exercise sover-
eign power to tax "without violating any established principle of international law"); 1
R. RHOADES & M. LANCER, supra note 6, § 1.11, at 1-3 (no rule of international law limits
United States power to tax); Norr, Jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAx. L.
REv. 431, 431 (1962) ("[n]o rules of international law exist to limit the extent of any
country's tax jurisdiction").
8 1 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6, § 1.11 (Code limitations stem solely
from congressional policy decisions).
9 J. BisCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 4
(2d ed. 1985).
10 I.R.C. §§ 11, 61 & 63 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). Citizenship of corporations is
based on the jurisdiction of incorporation. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4)-(5) (1982).
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its." By utilizing both residency and citizenship to assert United
States jurisdiction over a taxpayer's worldwide income12 and geo-
graphic location of income sources or wealth to tax foreign entities
on United States source income, the United States tax code reaches
more taxpayers and conduct than the codes of most other
jurisdictions. 13
The long reach of United States jurisdiction and the lack of in-
ternational law regulating a sovereign's power to tax combine to
create double taxation problems. Double taxation occurs when two
sovereigns, each acting within its self-created jurisdictional bounda-
ries, impose a full rate of tax on a single income.' 4 The specter of
double taxation discourages profitable international commerce by
threatening business entities with effective tax rates in excess of one
hundred percent of taxable income. 15 A government may act unilat-
erally to spare its constituents the burden of double taxation, 16 but
using bilateral tax treaties provides a more equitable and refined
solution.17
11 I.R.C. §§ 871,881 (1982 & Supp. II1984).
12 For example, few other countries impose tax jurisdiction based on citizenship as
well as residency. J. BISCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 5; Norr, supra note 7,
at 436-37.
13 Some jurisdictions, particularly Mediterranean and Latin American countries, ig-
nore citizenship or residency and impose income tax only on transactions or sources of
wealth geographically located within their borders. Norr, supra note 7, at 434-36; Note,
United States International Taxation:Jurisdiction to Tax and Accommodation Among Competing Tax
Systems, 1 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 36 (1979).
14 J. BIsCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 5. Double taxation may arise in
three ways:
1. Two countries assert tax jurisdiction over the parties ....
2. Two countries assert tax jurisdiction over the transaction ....
3. One country asserts tax jurisdiction over the parties and the other
asserts tax jurisdiction over the transaction ....
Id.
15 Id. at 6. For example, if two competing jurisdictions each impose a tax rate of
50%o, a taxpayer must pay 100% of his income to satisfy both jurisdictions' tax bill.
16 For example, a government may eliminate double taxation by offering a tax
credit for income taxes paid to a foreign government. See infra notes 31-32 and accom-
panying text.
17 Unlike unilateral solutions to double taxation, bilateral tax treaties require both
parties to forego opportunities for tax income. Kingson, The Coherence of International
Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1151, 1157 (1981). Moreover, bilateral solutions focus on
areas that unilateral solutions leave unaddressed. For example, bilateral treaties may
establish uniform rules for the concepts of taxable income, allowances and timing of
deductions, and conflicts in sourcing and allocating international income. Bischel, Basic
Treaty Structures and Provisions in TAx TRErATIES IN INTERNATIONAL PLANNING 9 (Practising
Law Inst. 1975). The United States recognizes bilateral income tax treaties in force with
35 countries and has approved but not yet put in force treaties with three countries. 10
FED. TAXEs (P-H) 42,001, at 42,007-42,009 (1985). Only one treaty, the 1933 U.S.S.R.
treaty, fails to address double taxation. 3 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6,
§ 14.03[4].
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Although each treaty's details may vary, 8 bilateral tax treaties
generally ease the burden of double taxation in two ways. First,
where a jurisdictional conflict arises over a transaction, the treaties
typically favor the income-earning party's country of residence over
the government with geographic jurisdiction over the income
source. 19 Second, the treaties reconcile and define common princi-
ples of taxation between the jurisdictions to facilitate the use of re-
ciprocal tax credits. 20 These treaties also establish an administrative
framework for the efficient exchange of information needed to po-
lice the treaty and prevent fraud or fiscal evasion by taxpayers. 21
The supremacy clause 22 of the Constitution bestows the author-
ity of congressional acts upon validly enacted treaties. The Internal
Revenue Code specifically provides that income exempt from taxa-
tion by virtue of a treaty obligation remains exempt under the
Code.23 Where treaty provisions directly collide with statutes, the
more recent rule prevails. 24 However, for a statute to override an
18 Variation among the treaties reflects the differences in negotiating postures be-
tween the United States and its individual treaty partners. See Kingson, supra note 17, at
1163-93. In 1977, the IRS unveiled a model treaty intended to provide a more consis-
tent framework for all future treaties. For the text of the treaty, see 3 R. RHOADES & M.
IANGER, supra note 6, § 15.02.
19 For example the Model Treaty provides that "[t]he business profits of an enter-
prise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise
carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment
situated therein." United States Model Income Tax Treaty, art. VII, reprinted in 3 R.
RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6, § 15.02[7]. See also P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, INmo-
DU TON TO UNrrED STATES INTERNAIONAL TAxATION 167-68 (1981) (describing treaty
objectives and techniques). The Model Treaty defines a permanent establishment as "a
fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly
carried on." United States Model Income Tax Treaty, art. V, reprinted in 3 R. RHOADES &
M. LANGER, supra note 6, § 15.02[5](1). One major exception to the rule giving tax pri-
ority to the country of residence lies in the "Savings Clause" found explicitly or implic-
itly in all United States treaties. Under the "Savings Clause," the United States retains
authority to tax its citizens as if the treaty were not in force. See, e.g., Convention with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Sept. 26, 1980, United States-Canada, art.
XXIX, repinted in 3 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6, § 25.29. Thus, for United
States taxpayers the treaties only reduce foreign tax liability, not domestic liability. J.
BISCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 280.
20 See, e.g., United States Model Income Tax Treaty, art. III (General Definitions),
reprinted in 3 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6, § 15.02[3].
21 See, e.g., United States Model Income Tax Treaty, art. XXVI (Exchange of Infor-
mation and Administrative Assistance), reprinted in 3 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra
note 6, § 15.02[26].
22 "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
23 I.R.C. § 894(a) (1982); see also id. § 7852(d) (preserving treaty benefits that ex-
isted prior to 1954 Code's adoption).
24 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) ("[A]n Act of Congress, which must
comply with the Constitution, is on a full parity with a treaty, and. . . when a statute
which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of
conflict renders the treaty null.") (footnote omitted); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
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existing treaty provision, Congress must clearly intend to abrogate
that provision.25
B. Subpart F and Foreign Corporations
By adding subpart F26 to the Internal Revenue Code in 1962,
Congress indirectly broadened the scope of United States tax juris-
diction to cover foreign corporations controlled by a small number
of United States shareholders. If more than fifty percent of a for-
eign corporation's voting stock resides in the hands of United States
shareholders, 27 then subpart F treats the corporation as a Con-
trolled Foreign Corporation subject to United States taxation on the
earnings and profits it generates for United States shareholders. 28
Despite this assertion of United States authority, ajurisdictional
problem remains because the subsidiary qualifies as a nonresident,
foreign citizen and earns income outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. 29 Congress avoided this jurisdictional obstacle
by taxing the United States shareholders of the foreign corporation
190, 194 (1888) ("When the [treaty and an act of legislation] relate to the same subject,
the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can
be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one
last in date will control the other .... ); Watson v. Hoey, 59 F. Supp. 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (" 'If there were any legislative violation of the treaties by the enactment of the
statute, that enactment being subsequent to the treaties would prevail over them in es-
tablishing the law for the courts of this country.' ") (quoting George E. Warren Corp. v.
United States, 94 F.2d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1938)).
25 See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) ("A treaty will not be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on
the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.").
26 I.R.C. §§ 951-970 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). Congress enacted subpart F to pre-
vent domestic corporations from manipulatingjurisdictional rules to shield their foreign
subsidiaries from American taxation. See, e.g., Special Message to the Congress on Taxa-
tion, 1961 PUB. PAPERS 290, 295 (speech by PresidentJohn F. Kennedy deploring unjus-
tified use of tax havens by American firms to defer United States income tax and urging
adoption of tax reform).
Before 1962, foreign corporations owned by domestic parents and receiving reve-
nues solely from non-United States sources fell outside United States jurisdiction.
Under these rules, a domestic corporation could reap considerable tax advantages by
funneling all profitable foreign business through a foreign corporation located in a tax
haven: the subsidiary pays a lower tax on its income to the host government, and the
domestic corporation defers paying the difference between the United States tax rate
and the haven's rate until the parent repatriates the earnings as a dividend or liquidation
distribution. It is possible for a foreign subsidiary to pay no tax to the host government
by incorporating in a country that asserts jurisdiction only on the basis of residency,
acquiring residency in a country that asserts jurisdiction only on the basis of geographic
source, and conducting business in a variety of countries that assert jurisdiction only on
the basis of residency.
27 A "United States shareholder" is any United States individual or corporation
owning more than 10% of the combined voting stock of a foreign corporation. I.R.C.
§§ 951(b) (1982), 951(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984), 7701(a)(30) (1982).
28 I.R.C. § 957(a) (1982).
29 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
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as if they recognized an allocable portion of the foreign corpora-
tion's profits in the form of a dividend.30 To prevent excessive or
double taxation, subpart F recognizes the subsidiary's duty to pay
taxes to its host government by allowing shareholders either a
credit 3 or a deduction3 2 for a pro rata share of all income taxes paid
by a foreign subsidiary to a foreign government. Hence, the subsid-
iary pays tax at the host country's corporate tax rate and the United
States shareholders pay only the difference between the United
States corporate tax rate and the haven's tax rate.
Domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries seek to avoid
application of subpart F because it destroys the advantages other-
wise available to foreign entities owned by United States sharehold-
ers but incorporated in a tax haven. First, because subpart F treats
domestic corporations with foreign subsidiaries as United States
shareholders, the domestic parent must eventually and sometimes
immediately recognize the foreign entity's earnings.33 Hence, the
domestic parent, as the principal or even sole shareholder, pays tax
30 I.R.C. § 95 1(a) (1982). Even if a shareholder never receives his allocable portion
of the earnings and profits, subpart F requires that he report his share in gross income.
Id. A shareholder may exclude from gross income actual distributions of earnings and
profits already taxed under subpart F. Id. § 959(a). Under I.R.C. § 961(a) (1982), a
shareholder increases his basis in the foreign corporation's stock by the amount of un-
distributed profits included in his gross income and decreases his basis when the profits
are actually distributed.
31 I.R.C. § 960(a) (1982) allows taxpayers who are subject to United States corpo-
rate tax rates a full credit for foreign income taxes paid.
32 I.R.C. § 162 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
33 I.R.C. § 952 (1982). Immediately taxed income includes subpart F income and
previously excluded subpart F income. Subpart F income consists of income derived
from the insurance of United States risks, increases in earnings that are invested in
United States property for the year, foreign base company income, earnings and profits
attributable to participation in or cooperation with an international boycott, and pay-
ments unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Id. § 952(a). Foreign
Base Company Income, defined in detail in I.R.G. § 954 (1982 & Supp. 111984), refers
to earnings and profits garnered from goods or services purchased from or sold to re-
lated parties as defined by I.R.C. § 954(a) (3) (1982), for use outside the foreign corpora-
tion's country of incorporation, passive investment income, shipping income, and oil
related income earned outside the country of incorporation. See P. McDANIEL & H.
AULT, supra note 19, at 120-25 (listing income taxable to United States shareholders,
including subpart F income due to increase in earnings invested in United States prop-
erty).
Subpart F excludes income earned within the foreign country of incorporation from
the list of immediately taxable earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 952(b) (1982). Conse-
quently, such earnings and profits fall beyond the limits of United States tax jurisdiction
until the United States parent repatriates them. This exception for in-country income
aids subsidiaries that legitimately incorporated in a foreign country to compete against
local corporations whose cost structures reflect only the host country's lower income tax
rate. That is, under subpart F, a foreign subsidiary pays the same low rate of tax as its
competitors to the host government. The domestic parent pays the difference between
the foreign host's tax rate and the United States rate only when the parent repatriates
the earnings. See P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 19, at 127-28.
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at the United States corporate rate on certain types of subsidiary
income. Second, Congress structured the taxing power of subpart F
to regulate foreign subsidiaries' adherence to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act3 4 and Anti-Boycott restrictions.3 5 Domestic corpora-
tions can no longer use foreign subsidiaries to circumvent the appli-
cation of these laws.
The emphasis on actual control of the foreign corporation-
substance over form-given by judicial and IRS interpretations of
subpart F, however, seriously hampers the ability of United States
shareholders to retain control over a foreign corporation while
avoiding application of subpart F. Treasury Regulation section
1.95736 converts the mechanical test of stock ownership3 7 into one
of substance. For example, if shareholders seeking to decontrol a
foreign corporation distribute fifty percent or more of the foreign
corporation's combined voting power, yet retain the privileges nor-
mally associated with control (such as the right to elect more than
half of the foreign corporation's board of directors or break dead-
locks on the board), then the foreign corporation remains a con-
trolled foreign corporation subject to subpart F.3 8 Consequently,
34 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note,
78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982)). The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act employs criminal
sanctions to discourage corporations from paying bribes to secure business or favorable
treatment from foreign government officials. Supplementing the Act's criminal sanc-
tions, subpart F taxes domestic parents on income a foreign subsidiary uses for bribes,
kickbacks, or other illegal payments, and specifically disallows a deduction for the cost of
those illegal payments. I.R.C. § 952(a)(4) (1982). Illegal payments, bribes, and kick-
backs are defined in id. § 162(c).
35 Id. § 952(a)(3). The anti-boycott provisions of subpart F penalize a domestic
parent when its subsidiary participates in an international boycott, defined in id.
§ 999(b)(3), by denying a deferral for earnings and profits generated by business attrib-
uted to the illegal participation, and denying tax benefits, such as tax credits, claimed in
relation to those earnings and profits. Id. § 952(a)(3).
36 Treas. Reg. § 1.957 (1963).
37 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
38 Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1(b)(1)-(2) (1963). The Tax Court has upheld the regula-
tion on several occasions. See, e.g., Garlock, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 423 (1972)
(literal avoidance of ownership requirements under § 957 insufficient to decontrol
where foreign shareholders had no interest in independently exercising their right to
control foreign corporation), aff'd, 489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. dniea 417 U.S. 911
(1974); see also Koehring Co. v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 929, aft'd, 583 F.2d 313 (7th
Cir. 1978) (implied agreement between foreign shareholder majority and United States
shareholder minority restricting power of majority to control corporation without ap-
proval of minority entitled IRS to ignore majority's formal ownership in calculating 50%
ownership under § 957). But see CCA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 137 (1975) (fact
that non-United States shareholder majority had limited interest in exercising independ-
ent voting control over foreign corporation did not dilute significance of majority's un-
restricted right to act independently under corporate charter). Commentators question
the vitality of CCA, Inc., because it preceded Koehring, which recognized that implied
agreements could modify express provisions in a corporate charter, and was never ap-
pealed by the IRS. See Corry, Stapled Stock-Timefor a New Look, 36 TAx L. REV. 167, 186
(1981).
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for a domestic corporation successfully to remove a wholly owned
subsidiary from the scope of subpart F, it must make an unrestricted
distribution of more than fifty percent of the foreign corporation's
stock to shareholders who do not qualify as United States share-
holders under section 957.39 Such a distribution sacrifices the do-
mestic parent's unimpaired control over the subsidiary and
threatens the continued beneficial, servient working relationship the
parent enjoyed with its former subsidiary.40
C. Stapled Stock
An alternative method of avoiding subpart F calls for restruc-
turing the parent's ownership of a foreign subsidiary by distributing
all of the subsidiary's stock directly to the domestic corporation's
shareholders. This method shields the foreign subsidiary from
United States taxation under subpart F by widely dispersing the sub-
sidiary's ownership among many shareholders who do not qualify as
"United States shareholders." Moreover, the common pool of own-
ership shared by the two corporations ensures that both companies
will continue to operate in a mutually beneficial manner. To perpet-
uate the common pool of ownership, the shares of both corpora-
tions undergo "stapling" or "pairing" which ties a unit of ownership
in one corporation to a unit of ownership in the other.
As a consequence of stapling, the distributing corporation-the
former parent-must recognize ordinary taxable gain because the
distribution of the foreign corporation's stock will cause the distrib-
uting corporation to recapture previously deferred earnings of the
foreign corporation. Stapling requires the newly paired corpora-
tions to orchestrate changes in capital structure to maintain the pair-
ing ratio. Taxpayers must recognize a taxable dividend upon
receipt of the distributed stock.
1. The Mechanics
The process of decontrol and pairing encompasses three
stages.41 In the first stage, the domestic corporation with significant
39 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
40 As a minority shareholder, the former parent could no longer exercise unfet-
tered control over the foreign corporation.
41 As an alternative, though no longer as popular, approach, the domestic corpora-
tion may create a trust that decontrols the subsidiary and ensures that the domestic and
foreign corporations share an identity of ownership. Schuldenfrei, Stock-Pairing to Decon-
trol a CFC, 6 INT'L TAx. J. 424, 425 (1980). The domestic corporation either distributes
the subsidiary's shares to a trustee with beneficial ownership residing in its shareholders
or issues a cash dividend to its shareholders who acquire a pro rata interest in a prear-
ranged trust by contributing the cash dividend to that trust. In the latter arrangement,
the trust uses the contributed cash dividend to purchase the subsidiary's stock from the
domestic corporation. In lieu of pairing the two stock issues, the shareholders' pro rata
1986] 1073
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foreign business creates a corporate shell outside the United States.
The domestic corporation selects a host country with more
favorable corporation regulations and a tax rate below the United
States corporate rate. The success of the stapled stock scheme rests
primarily on the potential savings offered by the new jurisdiction's
lower tax rate42 and less onerous restrictions on corporate con-
duct.4 3 At this stage, the domestic corporation retains complete
ownership of the foreign shell; thus, the foreign shell qualifies as a
controlled foreign corporation and remains subject to subpart F.44
The domestic and foreign corporations remain liable for the
equivalent of the United States corporate tax rate on foreign
earnings. 45
In the second stage, the domestic corporation converts the for-
eign entity from a shell to a working corporation by transferring
working assets from the domestic corporation to the foreign shell.
The domestic corporation suffers no adverse tax consequences
when the transfer involves cash or other property with a basis equal
to its value. When the transfer involves appreciated property, how-
ever, the corporation must recognize as gain the difference between
basis and value.4 6 Hence, the form4 7 of the transfer and its con-
interests in the trust accompany any transfer of stock in the domestic corporation. If the
trust acts as an agent for all shareholders of the domestic corporation and avoids classifi-
cation as a grantor trust or an independent entity, the Internal Revenue Service will
recognize decontrol because beneficial ownership of the foreign corporation will reside
in the hands of the shareholders. Rev. Rul. 54-140, 1954-1 C.B. 116. A grantor trust
exists where the grantor retains such control over the trust's corpus or income that the
Service treats the grantor as owner of the trust property for tax purposes. I.R.G.
§§ 671-677 (1982). If the trust constitutes an independent entity, and possesses more
than 50% of the foreign corporation's stock, the trust qualifies as a United States share-
holder under I.R.C. § 957 (1982), and the foreign corporation becomes a controlled
foreign corporation. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
42 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
43 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
44 See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
45 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
46 Recognition of gain is required to prevent domestic corporations from transfer-
ring appreciated property abroad and thereby avoiding United States tax on the gain
from the property's sale. P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, supra note 19, at 130-31.
47 A corporation seeking to transfer assets from an existing controlled foreign cor-
poration to a new controlled foreign corporation incorporated in a more favorable tax
haven must also guard against an "in-bound out-bound" format if it wishes to avoid
recognizing gain on the final transfer. An "in-bound out-bound" transfer occurs when
the domestic corporation acquires assets below market rates from the first controlled
foreign corporation and subsequently transfers the assets to the new controlled foreign
corporation. In the out-bound exchange, the domestic corporation faces liability under
§ 367 for the difference between the market value of the assets and their bases. If the
domestic corporation transfers cash or unappreciated property to the new subsidiary
and allows the two subsidiaries to make the final exchange, the assets may successfully
pass from one controlled foreign corporation to the other at below market rates without
adverse United States tax results. I.R.C. § 367 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
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tent48 turn on the desired tax consequences of the transfer.
In the third stage of the pairing process, the domestic corpora-
tion spins off the controlled foreign corporation by distributing the
foreign corporation's stock as a pro rata, in-kind dividend to its
shareholders. At the time of the distribution, both corporations re-
vise their bylaws. The amended bylaws prohibit conveying shares in
one corporation without a coincidental transfer of a specified
number of shares in the paired entity.49 Although no single factor
dictates the pairing ratio, ordinarily one share of the domestic cor-
poration is stapled to one share of the foreign corporation.50 To
warn subsequent purchasers of the transfer restrictions, the corpo-
rations may set forth the terms governing the pairing arrangement
on each stock certificate and in the corporate registers, or print each
set of paired stock certificates on one paper.5 x
2. The Effects
For the domestic corporation, the immediate tax consequence
of the distribution of the foreign subsidiary's stock springs from sec-
tion 1248's52 treatment of the distribution as a taxable sale or ex-
change of a controlled foreign corporation. Subpart F compels the
qualifying United States shareholders of a controlled foreign corpo-
ration to recognize only certain types of the subsidiary's income for
United States tax purposes. 53 Through section 1248, the Code
seeks to recapture the earnings unrecognized under subpart F by
treating the domestic corporation's gain on the distribution as a tax-
able dividend up to the amount of the foreign corporation's accu-
mulated untaxed earnings and profits. 54 For domestic corporations
distributing the stock of newly incorporated foreign companies, un-
taxed earnings and profits have not yet accumulated, and section
1248 has no impact.55
Following distribution and pairing, paired domestic corpora-
48 For example, in a service industry where contracts constitute the principal asset
of a business, a corporation may elect to retain existing foreign branch operations under
the domestic corporation and employ the new foreign corporation to handle subse-
quent, newly created foreign business opportunities. Such an arrangement only re-
quires the transfer of cash as a contribution to the foreign corporation's capital, and
avoids the adverse tax consequence of transferring appreciated assets from a domestic
corporation's foreign branch to the new foreign corporation. See supra note 46 and ac-
companying text.
49 See Schuldenfrei, supra note 41, at 425.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 I.R.C. § 1248 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
53 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
54 I.R.C. § 1248(f) (1982).
55 See Schuldenfrei, supra note 41, at 427.
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tions must accommodate the closely related sister corporation in all
stock-related activities. For example, a paired corporation may no
longer take advantage of section 361 to acquire another company in
a tax-free exchange of stock.56 Moreover, for a paired entity raising
capital in the equity markets, stapling requires that any alterations in
one corporation's equity structure match comparable modifications
in the sister corporation's equity structure. 57  Consequently,
notwithstanding differences in capital requirements, a corporation
must couple authorized increases in its own outstanding stock with a
corresponding issue of the paired sister corporation's stock.
For the shareholder receiving the foreign corporation's stock,
the distribution qualifies as a dividend subject to taxation as ordi-
nary income.58 The market value of the distributed stock deter-
mines the value of the dividend for tax purposes. 59 An in-kind
distribution tailored to satisfy the requirements of section 355 al-
lows the taxpayer to defer recognition of the distribution.
60
D. The Internal Revenue Service's Response
Since the emergence of pairing in the 1920s, the Internal Reve-
nue Service has claimed both that distribution and pairing create
two independent corporations and do not create two independent
corporations. Although never explicitly resolving the contradiction
56 To qualify for tax free status under I.R.C. § 361 (1982), shareholders must sell
their company solely in exchange for stock of equal value in the acquiring company.
However, a paired corporation cannot qualify because the matching paired shares in its
sister corporation must accompany a transfer of its own stock. Section 361(b) treats the
matching shares given to the target company's shareholders as stock of a corporation
not a party to the reorganization and, consequently, boot taxable to the acquired corpo-
ration's shareholders. See I.R.C. §§ 361 (1982), 368 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); RALPH M.
PARSONS Co., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 27 (Sept. 19, 1978); Corry,
supra note 38, at 189-90.
57 See Corry, supra note 38, at 190.
58 Rev. Rul. 54-140, 1954-1 C.B. 116.
59 Id. See also I.R.C. § 301(d) (1982) (calculation of basis in property received by
shareholder as corporate distribution). I.R.C. § 355 (1982) allows a taxpayer to defer
immediate recognition of the distribution if certain requirements are met. See infra note
60 and accompanying text.
Because the pairing restrictions on trading make it difficult to determine the in-
dependent value of a newly issued stock, the IRS employs valuation guidelines pub-
lished in Revenue Ruling 80-213, 1980-2 C.B. 102. The guidelines treat the favorable
advantages of stock pairing as additions to value, while ignoring some of the aspects
which may lower value. For example, in determining market value, the IRS acknowl-
edges that investors will value the foreign corporation more highly because it operates
beyond the reach of the United States regulations and taxes. Id. § 4.02. However, the
IRS overlooks reductions in market value caused by the stapling restrictions. Id. § 4.08.
60 I.R.C. § 355(a)(1) (1982). To satisfy § 355, the distributing corporation must
issue all or a controlling block of the controlled foreign corporation's stock, and both
the parent and controlled foreign corporation must have actively engaged in a trade or
business during the five-year period ending on the date of distribution.
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among court decisions and revenue rulings, the IRS has implicitly
adopted a position that distribution and pairing result in the suc-
cessful decontrol of controlled foreign corporations.
The peculiar history of stapled stock explains its current success
as the linchpin of tax avoidance schemes involving foreign earnings.
Regulations in the 1920s compelling banks to terminate nonbanking
related lines of business 61 spurred the first creative use of stapled
stock. Not wishing to relinquish the benefits of a profitable busi-
ness, many banks chose to spin off the prohibited activities into
newly formed domestic corporations, conveying ownership of these
new corporations to their shareholders. 62 The banks employed
trust funds and restrictions on stock transfers to pair the two corpo-
rations. The arrangement satisfied the banking requirements and
preserved the former subsidiary's servient, mutually beneficial rela-
tionship with the bank.6 3 Most important, profits earned by the new
corporation continued to benefit the bank's original shareholders. 64
The initial court decisions discussing stapled stock appeared in
two contexts: dividend tax treatment for shareholders receiving an
interest in the paired entity, and the allocation of basis between the
stapled interests for subsequent purchasers of the stapled shares.
Examining dividend tax treatment, the courts focused on whether a
shareholder receiving the distribution of a paired entity must report
the distribution as an immediately taxable dividend or delay recog-
nition until the shareholders disposed of the interest in a taxable
sale or exchange. In John G. Lonsdale65 a bank issued a cash distribu-
tion to its shareholders; most distributees then transferred the cash
to a trust authorized to purchase the bank's subsidiary. The share-
holders argued that because the pairing arrangement created com-
mon ownership and essentially common management, they received
an unseverable unit of ownership, consisting of the bank and its for-
mer subsidiary, no different from what they possessed prior to the
distribution.66 Accordingly, the shareholders argued they recog-
nized no taxable dividend. The Internal Revenue Service disagreed,
asserting that a valid and effective distribution of the subsidiary's
ownership had occurred. 67 The court agreed with the IRS and
61 See, e.g., National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-200 (1926) (prohibiting national
banks from engaging in certain business activities relating to real estate).
62 See, e.g., John G. Lonsdale, 11 B.T.A. 658, 660 (1928), aff'd, 32 F.2d 537 (8th
Cir), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 575 (1929).
63 Id. at 663-66.
64 Id.
65 11 B.T.A. 659 (1928), aff'd, 32 F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 575
(1929).
66 32 F.2d at 538.
67 Id.
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deemed the pairing arrangement irrelevant in determining the na-
ture of the distribution. The court noted that following the distribu-
tion there existed two " 'distinct legal organizations, operating
under separate charters, derived from different sources, and pos-
sessing independent powers and privileges.' "68 Consequently, the
shareholders received a distinct, individual, and therefore taxable
gain.
A decade later, on the issue of basis allocation for purchasers of
paired entities, the Internal Revenue Service adopted a contradic-
tory position. In Andre deCoppet69 a taxpayer sought to allocate his
purchase price among paired stocks in order to recognize a loss on
the worthlessness of one of the stocks. 70 The IRS disallowed the
allocation on the grounds that pairing created a single indivisible
investment. The Tax Court7 and the Second Circuit 72 agreed. Ac-
cording to Judge Learned Hand, the pairing cancelled an effective
distribution of beneficial ownership because it did not alter the sta-
tus quo: the owners of the bank continued to own the subsidiary by
virtue of their ownership of the bank.73 Gonsequently, Judge Hand
agreed with the IRS, concluding that the paired entity's bankruptcy
created "no more a 'realized' loss, than if [it] had been [that] of a
corporate subsidiary." 74
In 1954, the IRS attempted to reconcile this apparent contra-
diction by issuing Revenue Ruling 54-140.75 The ruling addressed
the tax treatment of a bank's distribution of a subsidiary's stock to a
trust created on behalf of the bank's shareholders. Citing the eco-
nomic effects of pairing7 6 and ignoring Andre deCoppet, the IRS found
that the transfer effectively distributed beneficial ownership and re-
quired the shareholders to recognize the distribution as a taxable
dividend. 77 The IRS litigated 54-140 in Earl R. Wilkinson 78 and, de-
68 Id. at 539 (quoting Oriscana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 88 (1918)).
Originally, courts read the decision in Lonsdale to turn on the nature of the distribution
as a cash dividend. Subsequent cases, however, dispelled this notion by emphasizing the
separateness of the two entities. See, e.g., Mrs. Frank Andrews, 26 B.T.A. 642, 653-54
(1932) (that taxpayer enjoyed no option to receive dividend as cash irrelevant in light of
broad principles articulated in Lonsdale).
69 38 B.T.A. 1381 (1938), af'd, 108 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1940).
70 Id. at 1388, 1392.
71 Id. at 1393.
72 108 F.2d at 789.
73 Id. at 788-89.
74 Id. at 787, 789.
75 1954-1 C.B. 116.
76 The shift of the subsidiary's ownership from the bank to the shareholders put the
subsidiary beyond the reach of third parties such as the bank's creditors or depositors.
Id. at 116-17.
77 Id. at 117.
78 29 T.C. 421 (1957), nonacq. 1960-1 C.B. 7.
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spite losing, continues to maintain that distribution and pairing cre-
ate two separate and identifiable corporations. The service issued a
nonacquiescence in Wilkinson 79 and reasserted in Revenue Ruling
69-15580 the basic premise of Lonsdale and Revenue Ruling 54-140:
a distribution and pairing create two independent entities; the re-
ceiving shareholders must recognize the distribution as a taxable
dividend.
When stock pairing between a domestic and a foreign corpora-
tion first emerged as a means of avoiding United States tax liability
on foreign income, the IRS faced a curious dilemma. The IRS could
have disallowed pairing as a means of converting a domestic corpo-
ration with a foreign subsidiary into paired brother-sister entities,
but could have continued to tax the distribution.8 ' Alternatively,
the Service could have tolerated pairing as a tax avoidance scheme,
and relied on a uniform recognition of a distribution's effect on
ownership. Although never formally ruling on the matter, the IRS
implicitly chose to accept stock pairing as a legitimate means of
avoiding United States tax liability. In a pair of private letter rul-
ings, 2 the Service found that a corporation's distribution of stock in
a paired entity constituted a dividend taxable to the corporation
under section 1248 for accumulated, untaxed earnings and profits.83
Although the Service failed in the second ruling to address directly
the question of tax treatment for shareholders receiving the distri-
bution, the stipulated facts underlying this ruling implicitly assumed
that the distribution would occur in the form of a declared dividend
subject to immediate recognition by shareholders.8 4
Because the IRS recognizes a valid and effective distribution of
ownership, a domestic corporation that distributes a former subsidi-
ary's stock among a large number of shareholders removes the for-
eign corporation from the reach of subpart F. Even the attribution
of control tests found in Treasury Regulation section 1.95785 should
not change this result. Whatever control a particular pairing vests
79 1960-1 C.B. 7.
80 1969-1 C.B. 93.
81 The IRS would tax the distribution on the theory that it created brother-sister
entities. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
82 Letter Ruling 7839012, IRS LETTER RuLINGs book 6, fiche 5 (CCH 1978)
(microfiche); Letter Ruling 7842104, IRS LErR RULINGS book 7, fiche 2 (CGH)
(microfiche), amended by Letter Ruling 7852101, IRS LETrER RULINGS book 8, fiche 3
(CCH 1978) (microfiche).
83 See Letter Ruling 7839012, IRS LE'rER RULINGS book 6, fiche 5 (CCH 1978)
(microfiche). For a discussion of § 1248, see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
84 See Letter Ruling 7842104, IRS LErER RULINGS book 7, fiche 2 (CCH)
(microfiche), amended by Letter Ruling 7852101, IRS LErER RULINGS book 8, fiche 3
(CCH 1978) (microfiche).
85 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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in a domestic corporation, the issue of control remains largely irrel-
evant because the domestic corporation retains no stock on which
the IRS could calculate tax liability under subpart F.8 6
Despite the Service's implicit approval of the use of stapled
stock, tolerating a means of avoiding United States tax liability on
foreign income generated dissent within the IRS.8 7 The growing
popularity of stapled stock in the late 1970s,88 despite the Service's
refusal to explicitly sanction stapled stock as a means of avoiding tax
under subpart F,8 9 prompted many commentators to warn inter-
ested corporations against tying paired entities too closely
together. 90
II
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO STOCK PAIRING
Congress twice addressed the problem of stapled stock. In its
first effort to close this tax loophole, Congress failed to enact legis-
lation that would have treated the foreign paired corporation as a
wholly owned subsidiary of the distributing corporation. In its sec-
ond effort, Congress recognized a broader range of problems posed
by stapled stock and adopted section 269B as a palliative. Section
269B permits the United States unilaterally to modify bilateral in-
come tax treaties in order to extend tax jurisdiction directly over
paired foreign corporations.
A. Initial Effort
Congress first considered acting to end taxpayers' use of sta-
86 Subpart F may apply through an IRS finding of constructive voting control over a
foreign corporation. See I.R.C. § 958(b) (1982). Nevertheless, stock ownership forms
the basis for calculating the per share tax liability required by I.R.C. § 951 (a)(2) (1982).
See Cliff, Pairing: A Technique for Avoiding Controlled Foreign Corporation Status and Other Bur-
dens of U.S. Taxation, 57 TAXEs 530, 535 (1979). Thus, § 951 imposes tax liability for the
foreign corporation's income only on taxpayers who actually own stock in the foreign
corporation.
87 G.C.M. 38244 (Jan. 24, 1980).
88 Many of the prominent stock pairing arrangements appeared in the late 1970s.
See RALPH M. PARSONS Co., supra note 56; L.E. MYERS Co., PROXY STATEMENT (Nov. 9,
1977). The sudden interest in stock pairing may have grown from the contemporaneous
decline in the value of the dollar and reintroduction of human rights concerns as a part
of official United States foreign policy. See Cliff, supra note 86, at 530-31. The lull in
stock pairing that has appeared since 1980 may indicate a cautious response by Ameri-
can corporations to Treasury Department efforts to attack stapled stock through post-
1980 legislation. See Corry, supra note 38, at 187-88.
89 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
90 See Corry, supra note 38, at 183-87 (discussing decontrol of controlled foreign
corporations); Fitzgerald, Does Service's Position on "Stapled Stock" Open a Loophole for For-
eign Operations?, 50J. TAx'N 354, 357 (1979) (discussing possible IRS responses to close
loophole).
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pled stock to avoid subpart F in 1980. A report 9' commissioned by
the Treasury Department to study taxpayers' use of tax havens
called attention to the abusive use of stapled stock92 and recom-
mended that the IRS reconsider the position embodied in Revenue
Ruling 54-140.93 Rather than attack the problem through adminis-
trative action,94 the Treasury Department supported a bill95
designed to nullify "the use of [stapled stock] to escape taxation of
Subpart F income."' 96 This first proposal to regulate the use of sta-
pled stock died for lack of interest that same year.97
Under the proposal, a foreign corporation paired with a domes-
tic corporation would have qualified as a wholly owned subsidiary of
the domestic corporation. 98 Because the domestic corporation
would have constituted the beneficial owner of the subsidiary, the
proposal treated any dividend or other property distributed by the
foreign corporation as a distribution first to the domestic corpora-
tion and, subsequently, to the shareholders. 99 The original distribu-
tion of the foreign corporation's stock by the domestic corporation
would not have resulted in a taxable event for the recipient until the
shareholders terminated the pairing arrangement. 100 In effect,
when a distribution and pairing involved a foreign and domestic
corporation, the proposal adopted the Tax Court's position in Earl
R. Wilkinson:10 pairing creates a single indivisible investment and
therefore cancels an effective distribution of the beneficial owner-
ship of the foreign corporation. 102
B. Successful Second Effort
Congress's second effort to end the abusive use of stapled stock
owes much of its success to congressional concern in 1984 for nar-
91 Gordon, Tax Havens and Their Use By United States Taxpayers-An Overview (1980)
(Report to Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Assistant Attorney General (Tax Divi-
sion), and Assistant Secretary of Treasury (Tax Policy) by Richard Gordon, Special
Counsel for International Taxation).
92 Id. at 92, 133-34.
93 Id. at 133-34.
94 The IRS could have revoked Revenue Ruling 54-140, see supra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text, and acquiesced to Wilkinson, see supra notes 78-79 and accompany-
ing text. See also infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (discussing why administra-
tive action might have been less desireable than legislative solution).
95 H.R. 8110, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 25,412-13 (1980).
96 126 CONG. REc. 25411 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
97 See Corry, supra note 38, at 187.
98 H.R. 8110, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4, 126 CONG. REC. 25,412 (1980).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 29 T.C. 421 (1957), nonacq. 1960-1 C.B. 7. For a discussion of Wilkinson, see
supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
102 Wilkinson, 29 T.C. at 426.
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rowing the projected budget deficit by closing tax loopholes to en-
hance revenue collection. 10 3 The House Report 0 4 on proposed
section 269B states several reasons why Congress targeted stapled
stock for reform. First, Congress noted the uncertainty surrounding
the tax consequences and treatment under subpart F of a domestic-
to-foreign pairing arrangement. 0 5 Second, Congress expressed
concern that by undercharging its foreign counterpart for goods or
services, a domestic paired corporation could funnel its own profits
abroad through the untaxable foreign counterpart. 106 Although
recognizing that "[t]he United States has the right to correct im-
proper transfer prices between related parties, ' 107 Congress found
that existing provisions could not always adequately cope with such
a complicated and difficult issue.'0 8 Third, Congress observed that
stapling enabled paired corporations to avoid anti-boycott rules and
other regulatory measures enforced, in part, by the tax code. 10 9
Fourth, Congress believed that tolerating the continued "use of
such a transparent device [as stapled stock] would have weakened
the integrity of the tax system."" 0 By closing the loophole, Con-
gress sought to eliminate these four problems and expected to in-
crease budget receipts by approximately five million dollars
annually.' 11
103 Congress passed I.R.C. § 269B (Supp. 11 1984) as part of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494.
104 H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1543 (1984) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT], reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 1178.
105 See id. at 1543, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1178-79; supra
notes 61-90 and accompanying text.
106 See HousE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1544, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1179. Congress noted that in nonstapled corporations such transactions
are policed by the threat of shareholder derivative suits designed to prevent the share-
holders' company from transferring profits to an unrelated, foreign corporation. Be-
cause the shareholders of the transferee and transferor corporations are identical in
exchanges involving paired corporations, shareholders are unlikely to be hurt by such
exchanges. Therefore, closing the loophole remains the province of the federal govern-
ment. Id.
107 Id. I.R.C. § 482 (1982) allows the IRS to restructure intercompany transfers by
allocating gross income, deductions, and credits between the parties as if the transaction
occurred between arms-length dealers.
108 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1544, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1179. For a discussion of the difficulties underlying IRS use of § 482 to
police intercompany transactions, see REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, IRS COULD BETTER
PROTECT U.S. TAX INTERESTS IN DETERMINING THE INCOME OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS (Sept. 30, 1981); Note, Service Discretion and Burden of Proof in International Tax Cases
Involving Section 482, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1982).
109 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1544, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1180; supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
110 HousE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1544, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 1180.
111 See id. at 1547, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1183. But see The
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As enacted by Congress, section 269B subtly alters the jurisdic-
tional rules governing the tax treatment of foreign entities paired
with domestic corporations. Prior to section 269B's enactment, di-
rect United States tax jurisdiction extended only to United States
citizens, United States residents, or foreign entities earning income
from sources located geographically within the United States."12
Under the general rule of section 269B, however, the Code asserts
United States tax jurisdiction over foreign entities stapled to domes-
tic corporations and thus treats the stapled foreign entities as do-
mestic corporations.'13 Consequently, foreign paired entities
remain subject to direct taxation of their worldwide income, regard-
less of its source." 14 Moreover, because distribution and pairing no
longer remove a foreign corporation from United States jurisdic-
tion, the paired corporation may engage in tax-free intercompany
transfers. 1 5 Only by terminating the pairing arrangement can a for-
eign corporation escape United States tax jurisdiction." 6
Paired entities may avoid application of section 269B if the do-
mestic corporation admits to "owning all interests in the foreign
corporation that constitute stapled interests with respect to stock of
the U.S. corporation."' " 7 For paired corporations that exercise this
option, the domestic corporation must constitute, under subpart F,
a United States shareholder" 8 of a controlled foreign corporation,
and must consequently recognize certain income, including subpart
F income, of the foreign corporation" 9 in proportion to its deemed
ownership. 120
Section 269B applies to any group of two or more entities in
IRS Gets a Staple Remover, FORBES, Nov. 7, 1983, at 225 (estimating revenue losses at $20
million over three years).
112 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
113 I.R.C. § 269B(a)(1) (Supp. I 1984).
114 Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 11, 61 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (imposing tax on corpora-
tions and defining taxable gross income respectively).
115 I.R.C. § 367 (1982 & Supp. I 1984) does not apply because the paired foreign
corporation is now deemed a domestic corporation. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104,
at 1545, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONrG. & AD. NEws at 1181; supra note 46.
116 On termination of the pairing arrangement, the foreign corporation will no
longer constitute a domestic corporation. Hence, § 367 will treat the termination as a
transfer of assets to a foreign corporation and require recognition of gain. See supra
notes 46 & 115.
117 HousE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1545, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 1181. This election must have occurred within 180 days of § 269B's enactment
and is irrevocable without the consent of the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate.
I.R.C. § 269B(c) (Supp. 11 1984).
118 See supra note 27.
119 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
120 For example, a domestic corporation stapled to 50% of a foreign corporation
must recognize 50% of the foreign corporation's earnings and profits subject to indirect
United States taxation under subpart F. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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which more than fifty percent of the beneficial ownership of one en-
tity consists of stapled interests.12' A stapled interest exists where
restrictions on transfer or ownership of the stock in one entity re-
quire the transfer of tandem interests in the other entity. 22 Section
269B(c)(1) defines an "entity" as "any corporation, partnership,
trust, association, estate, or other form of carrying on a business or
activity.' 23
The rule enunciated by section 269B conflicts with many of the
existing United States bilateral income tax treaties. A typical treaty
exempts foreign corporations from paying United States taxes on
United States source industrial or commercial profits unless the cor-
poration conducts its business from a permanent United States es-
tablishment. 124 Congress recognized this conflict 25 and evinced a
clear intent to override the treaties for all pairings consummated
afterJune 30, 1983.126 For any pairing that existed prior to the cut-
off date, Congress authorized an exemption from section 269B until
the treaty could be renegotiated to conform with section 269B. 127
III
ANALYSIS
Tax avoidance through the use of stapled stock posed a com-
plex problem. Congressional action offered the most certain and
timely solution. The method embodied by section 269B, however,
suffers from drawbacks more serious than the problem it seeks to
eliminate. First, the expansion of United States tax jurisdiction over
foreign entities paired with domestic corporations fails to conform
with either traditional United States or international standards of
tax jurisdiction and is overbroad. Second, section 269B's unilateral
modification of bilateral tax treaties threatens the continued viability
and cooperative enforcement of existing United States tax treaties.
The Treasury Department's 1980 proposal offers a superior al-
ternative to section 269B. By ignoring the distribution of a foreign
corporation's stock, and treating the domestic corporation as the
beneficial owner of the foreign corporation, the Treasury Depart-
121 I.R.C. § 269B(c)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
122 Id. § 269B(c)(3).
123 Id. § 269B(c)(1).
124 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1546, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 1191 (citing art. III(1) of the United States-Netherlands Income Tax
Treaty); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
125 See HousE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1546, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 1181.
126 I.R.C. § 269B(d) (Supp. 11 1984).
127 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1545-46, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
&AD. NEws at 1181.
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ment's alternative expands the United States jurisdiction in a man-
ner more consistent with traditional United States and international
standards of tax jurisdiction and avoids the unilateral modification
of bilateral tax treaties.
A. Congress's Timely Action
The problem posed by stapled stock merited Congress's atten-
tion. Although Congress estimated that stapled stock cost the gov-
ernment less than $5 million annually, 128 taxpayers were resorting
to stapled stock with growing frequency, 129 and literature was in-
creasingly touting the tax avoidance benefits of stapled stock.' 30
Moreover, taxpayers recently employing stapled stock arrangements
often cited tax avoidance as their primary motive.'8 ' In fact, even
where taxpayers resorted to stapled stock for legitimate reasons, 3 2
the nature of stapled stock dictated that the paired foreign entity
would avoid United States tax liability. 135 Such flagrant manipula-
tion of jurisdictional rules to circumvent United States tax laws
threatened the integrity and continued viability of United States for-
eign tax provisions. 8 4
Congress's decision to attack stapled stock through legislation
avoided the pitfalls of uncertainty and inadequacy that would result
from an administrative solution imposed by the Internal Revenue
Service. The most likely administrative solution'3 5 would have re-
quired the IRS to disallow pairing as a means of creating separate
corporations; yet, inconsistently, would have taxed the distribution
of the newly issued paired entity's stock on the grounds that benefi-
cial ownership resided in the hands of the shareholders.'1 6 More-
over, the policing of transactions between domestic and paired
entities to ensure arms-length transfer pricing would most likely
have failed to limit or prevent the abusive use of stapled stock,' s7
because the necessary and relevant provision of the Code had
128 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 88.
130 See A Plan to Shelter Overseas Profits, Bus. WK., Oct. 9, 1978, at 112; Cliff, supra note
86; Fitzgerald, supra note 90; Schuldenfrei, supra note 41.
131 See, e.g., L.E. MYERS Co., supra note 88, at 2 (pairing allows stockholders to par-
ticipate in foreign subsidiary's earnings at corporate level and reduces threat of adverse
consequences resulting from international boycotts).
132 See infra note 160.
13 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
185 See Corry, supra note 38, at 186-87.
136 The IRS would continue to tax the distributing corporation as if it retained bene-
ficial ownership of the paired entity. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
137 A domestic entity could sell goods below cost to its foreign paired entity. The
foreign entity then could sell the goods at a price sufficient to recoup the domestic cor-
poration's losses and add its own profits. I.R.C. § 482 (1982) allows the IRS to restruc-
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proven cumbersome and inadequate.138 Even the Treasury Depart-
ment lobbied for a legislative solution to the complex problems
posed by stapled stock.'3 9
B. The Jurisdictional Problems of Section 269B
Extending jurisdiction under section 269B deviates from the
standard of reasonableness that traditionally governs expansion of
United States tax jurisdiction. Although section 269B targets for-
eign entities created and paired for the purpose of avoiding United
States tax liability, Congress failed to assert persuasive grounds for
direct tax jurisdiction over a completely foreign corporation's
worldwide income. Section 269B sweeps more broadly than neces-
sary to achieve Congress's aim, and consequently creates needless
conflict with other tax jurisdictions.
Under section 269B, the United States asserts in personam tax
jurisdiction over paired foreign corporations by treating them as do-
mestic corporations.' 40 A domestic corporation, defined as a corpo-
ration "created or organized in the United States or under the law
of the United States or of any State,"141 pays United States tax on its
worldwide income. 142 Because section 269B does not derive in per-
sonam jurisdiction from residency or citizenship, 143 jurisdiction pre-
sumably springs from the foreign corporation's pairing
arrangement with a domestic corporation. That is, section 269B
must predicate jurisdiction not on the ownership characteristics
themselves, but on the intangible interactive effects emanating from
the ownership characteristics a paired domestic entity shares with its
sister foreign entity.144
Asserting direct United States tax jurisdiction on the basis of
ture the pricing as if the transaction occurred between arms-length dealers and assign
reasonable profits to the domestic corporation.
138 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 104, at 1544, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 1179. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
139 In 1980 Rep. Rostenkowski introduced H.R. 8110, the Treasury Department's
proposed legislative solution. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
140 I.R.C. § 269B(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying
text.
141 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (1982). See supra notes 10, 26 and accompanying text.
142 I.R.C. §§ 11, 61 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
143 Section 269B is silent on its basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction, but it
cannot rely on residency or citizenship because the paired foreign corporation is a for-
eign corporation doing business in a foreign country.
144 Alternative explanations of § 269B's basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction
fail for lack of logic and evidence. Unlike subpart F, application of § 269B does not
hinge on defined ownership characteristics that might prove that the foreign corporation
operated on behalf of a concentrated, predominantly United States ownership. Nor
does § 269B rely on proof of common management, evidence of close operational ties,
or the existence of strict pairing rules that make future separation highly unlikely, any of
which might indicate the distribution and pairing constituted a sham.
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common ownership ignores the separate legal personality typically
accorded incorporated entities 45 and fails to conform to policy con-
siderations underlying previous attempts to bring foreign corpora-
tions within United States tax jurisdiction. Through sections 881146
and 882,147 Congress expressly approved international jurisdic-
tional standards providing that taxing authorities could only levy di-
rect taxes against foreign corporations on earnings effectively and
substantially connected with the geographic territory of the taxing
authority. 148 Additionally, under subpart F, Congress recognized
that even concentrated United States ownership of a foreign corpo-
ration did not necessarily justify direct tax jurisdiction over that for-
eign corporation.' 49 Instead, Congress took advantage of an
exception to the standard rules of international jurisdiction to look
through the separation between a corporation and its shareholders
by imposing a tax on the United States shareholders who comprised
the foreign corporation for their pro rata share of the foreign corpo-
ration's earnings.' 50
Section 269B, in contrast, radically departs from traditional and
accepted rules of international tax jurisdiction. First, it disregards
incorporation in order to ascertain common ownership. Then, un-
like subpart F, which imposes indirect tax through the individual
shareholders already under United States tax jurisdiction, section
145 See infra note 149.
146 I.R.C. § 881 (1982 & Supp. 111984). Section 881 taxes foreign corporations on
income derived from United States sources. United States source income is defined in
id. §§ 861-864.
147 Id. § 882. Section 882 taxes income earned from conducting a United States
trade or business.
148 Regardless of a jurisdiction's taxing method, nonresident or noncitizen taxpay-
ers need only pay taxes on income earned from sources located within the taxing
power's territorial jurisdiction. See Norr, supra note 7, at 438.
149 The principles underlying United States and international law recognize that in-
corporation creates an entity distinguishable from its shareholders. See H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 78 (3d ed. 1983). The characteristics and con-
duct of the corporation, not its shareholders, generally determine which governments
may exercise jurisdiction over the corporation. Id.; see also Thompson, United States Juris-
diction Over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & PouicY
INT'L Bus. 319 (1983). An exception arises where the separateness does not relate to
legitimate business purposes. See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra, § 146. In such a case,
a government may pierce the corporate veil of separateness and impose jurisdiction over
the shareholders for conduct of the foreign corporation. See Thompson, supra, at 365;
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 216 &
comment d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (noting that United States may regulate foreign
subsidiary through territorial and national links to entities that control or own it). For a
discussion of corporate separateness as it relates to issues of taxation, see Watts, Tax
Problems of Regard for the Corporate Entity, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 867 (1962); J. BISCHEL &
R. FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 9, at 283-84.
150 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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269B extends jurisdiction directly over the foreign corporation.1 51
Moreover, unlike sections 881 and 882, section 269B does not re-
quire a substantial nexus between United States territory and taxa-
ble income as an alternative to United States residence or
citizenship. A common ownership link between a domestic and for-
eign corporation hardly demonstrates that the corporation's world-
wide income stems directly from a United States source or a United
States trade or business. Rather, the American unwillingness to tax
directly a foreign paired corporation's worldwide income when it
operates as a foreign subsidiary strongly suggests that this income
lies outside the traditional boundaries of United States tax
jurisdiction. 152
The new law is also overbroad in two respects. First, because
the mere act of pairing triggers section 269B, the rule precludes
analysis of individual pairing arrangements to determine whether
the taxpayer intended to avoid tax liability and whether the attrib-
utes of control or ownership actually justify direct United States tax
jurisdiction. For example, because section 269B only looks for com-
mon ownership of foreign and domestic entities, and not at the
characteristics of that common ownership,1 53 it brings within United
States tax jurisdiction pairing arrangements that staple a domestic
corporation to its former parent, a foreign corporation. 154 Yet, sec-
tion 269B's legislative history does not show that Congress intended
to expand United States tax jurisdiction to reach the worldwide in-
come of a foreign parent corporation owned by nonresident foreign
nationals when the pairing arrangement does not involve United
States tax avoidance motives and when interaction between the
paired entities may account for only a small fraction of the foreign
corporation's total business operations. 155
Second, by employing a more narrowly drafted statute which
equated the tax treatment of paired foreign entities with controlled
151 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
154 Section 269B applies to any domestic corporation stapled to a foreign corpora-
tion. I.R.C. § 269B(a) (Supp. 11 1984). See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
155 Nothing in the original legislative history of § 269B suggests Congress intended
that the provision tax income that originally lay outside United States tax jurisdiction
prior to the pairing. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
In recent legislation, Congress tackled this problem. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 1810(j)(2), 132 CONG. REC. S8954-55 (daily ed.June 26, 1986) (passed House of
Representatives and Senate and now before House-Senate Conference Committee). As
modified the new version of § 269B would tax only those paired entities in which half or
more of the voting power and half or more of the value of the paired entities reside in
the hands of United States persons. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (1982) defines United States
person as a citizen or resident of the United States, a domestic partnership, a domestic
corporation, and any nonforeign estate or trust.
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foreign corporations,15 6 Congress could have achieved its express
purpose-closing a tax loophole created by stapled stock-without
unduly discriminating against foreign stapled entities.' 5 7 As en-
acted, section 269B inflicts more disadvantageous tax treatment on
paired foreign corporations than that given controlled foreign cor-
porations under subpart F. Subpart F recognizes the need of for-
eign corporations indirectly subject to United States taxation to
remain on a competitive par with foreign corporations; it allows
controlled foreign corporations to exclude from immediate United
States taxation income garnered from business activity concluded
within the host country's geographical limits.' 58 Section 269B offers
no such exclusion to paired entities. Instead, paired foreign corpo-
rations must pay tax on worldwide income in the year earned.'5 9
This tax treatment creates strong incentives for paired entities to
implement costly and complex reorganizations to requalify as a con-
trolled foreign corporation. Consequently, section 269B's discrimi-
natory treatment indirectly removes stapled stock from American
corporations' repertoire of legitimate organizational structures.' 6 0
Section 269B's deviation from traditional standards ofjurisdic-
tion and overbreadth create needless conflict with foreign govern-
ments. A host country maintains a significant interest in taxing and
controlling the conduct of an entity incorporated under its laws be-
cause the corporation plays a role in the host country's economic
and development policies, augments the tax rolls, and creates em-
ployment. 16 ' Subpart F recognizes this significant interest by only
asserting indirect jurisdiction over foreign corporations by taxing
their United States shareholders.' 6 2 Sections 881 and 882 limit di-
rect taxation of foreign corporations to income derived from
156 For an example, see infra text accompanying notes 185-203.
157 The legislative history indicates no desire to totally eliminate stapled stock. See
supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
158 See supra note 33. For example, if a host country taxes corporations at a rate
below the United States corporate rate, and the controlled foreign corporation had to
pay indirectly through its shareholders the difference to the United States government,
then the controlled foreign corporation would have a higher cost structure and lower
profit margin than competitors who only paid the host government's tax.
159 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. The paired corporations could
avoid this problem, but only if the domestic corporation elects to treat the foreign entity
as a subsidiary and bear direct liability for taxes on the foreign corporation's income. See
supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
160 Although tax avoidance and circumvention of banking laws are the most noted
uses of stapled stock, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text, corporations might
resort to stapled stock for other reasons. For example, pairing offers shareholders a
better means of insulating a subsidiary from interference by a parent corporation's cred-
itors or other interested third parties. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
161 See Thompson, supra note 149, at 392-93.
162 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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sources or conduct within United States territory.' 63 Section 269B,
however, imposes direct jurisdiction over paired foreign corpora-
tions, an area traditionally reserved for foreign governments.'6
This direct taxation increases the likelihood of conflict between the
traditional interests of foreign governments and the newly extended
interests of the United States. 165 Moreover, section 269B legiti-
mates an expansive approach to tax jurisdiction, and exacerbates
the problems of double taxation as each government seeks to assert
the primacy of its right to tax directly certain entities. For example,
foreign governments, resenting section 269B's intrusion on their
sovereignty, may similarly expand their jurisdiction to impinge on
the United States's sovereignty.
C. Threat to Tax Treaties Posed by Section 269B
Congress acted within the limits of its constitutional author-
ity 1 66 when it expressly stipulated that section 269B overrides all ex-
isting contrary treaty provisions. 167 Nonetheless, this unilateral
modification of bilaterally negotiated treaties seriously jeopardizes
their viability and the continued cooperation of treaty partners. The
important role played by tax treaties in United States tax policy
greatly outweighs the anticipated increase in tax revenues generated
by section 269B.
A tax treaty is the product of a host of mutually acceptable com-
promises reached through negotiations between two governments
with conflicting tax policies. To achieve its primary aims, each
country sacrifices its lesser interests and accommodates the tax aims
of the other.168 When a government unilaterally imposes new terms
and alters existing provisions of a tax treaty, it subverts the com-
promises inherent in a treaty. Hence, by overriding tax treaties, sec-
tion 269B injects uncertainty into the value and integrity of tax
treaties with the United States and discourages potential treaty part-
ners and existing treaty partners seeking to update an existing treaty
from participating in good-faith negotiations. Moreover, section
269B's disregard of the sanctity of bilateral solutions to problems
created by conflicting tax policies jeopardizes the continued cooper-
ative enforcement of existing tax treaties. For example, the success
163 See supra notes 143, 148 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
165 For example, through the IRC, Congress sought to penalize the participation of
corporations subject to United States tax jurisdiction in international boycotts. See supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text. However, a host country may wish to require cor-
porations created under its aegis to participate in such a boycott.
166 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
168 See Kingson, supra note 17, at 1157; supra note 17.
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of treaties rests heavily on the coordinated administration of their
information exchange provisions to help prevent fraud or fiscal eva-
sion by taxpayers.' 69 A perceived reduction in the United States's
cooperative administration of the treaty may induce a correspond-
ing reduction by treaty partners in the priority they accord treaty
policing.
Prior to section 269B, Congress expressly overrode treaties on
only two occasions.' 70 First, the Revenue Act of 1962 11 expressly
superseded a minor clause relating to real estate tax contained in a
treaty with Greece. 172 The Treasury Department undertook imme-
diate negotiations with Greece which culminated in a revised edition
in 1964.173 Second, the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax
Act of 1980174 overrode capital gains treatment of income earned
from the disposition of United States real property by foreign inves-
tors under nine tax treaties.' 7 5 The nine treaties generally involved
industrialized or Eastern Bloc countries.176 Congress intentionally
delayed the override by five years to allow the Treasury Department
to renegotiate as soon as possible. 177
In contrast, section 269B overrides the part of nearly all tax
treaties that limits direct United States taxation of a treaty partner's
corporations to income derived from a permanent United States es-
tablishment.' 78 Although entities stapled as ofJune 30, 1983, retain
their protected status, 179 the new provision immediately overrides
treaties as to subsequently paired entities without providing a delay
to allow for renegotiations.18 0 Moreover, unlike prior statutory
overrides, section 269B directly overrides tax treaties with tax haven
169 See Gordon, supra note 91, at 163-64; supra note 17.
170 See 3 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6, § 9.02[4]; Rosenbloom& Langbein,
United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 400-01
(1981).
171 Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
172 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on the Estates of Dead Per-
sons, Feb. 20, 1950, United States-Greece, 5 U.S.T. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 2901.
173 Protocol Modifying and Supplementing the Convention of February 20, 1950,
United States-Greece, Feb. 12, 1964, 18 U.S.T. 2853, T.I.A.S. No. 6375.
174 Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2682 (1980).
175 The Act affected treaties with Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Fin-
land, Belgium, Japan, Romania, and Poland. 3 R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, supra note 6,
§ 11.03[4].
176 Id.
177 See Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 170, at 360, 401 (International Tax
Counsel of Department of Treasury addressing Subcommittee on Oversight of House
Ways and Means Committee).
178 For the Model Treaty definition of a permanent establishment, see supra note 19.
The United States-Soviet Union tax treaty serves as an exception because it contains no
permanent establishment clause. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
180 Id.
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jurisdictions.18 1 Hence, in seeking to end an abuse of tax havens
which costs the Treasury Department approximately $5 million an-
nually,' 8 2 Congress has jeopardized the continued viability of trea-
ties which oversee tax evasion and fraud 8 3 relating to the more than
$23 billion invested in tax havens by American taxpayers.' 8 4
D. Alternative Solution
Regulating stapled stock presents difficult tax jurisdiction
problems. Nonetheless, the Treasury Department's original solu-
tion, which indirectly extends United States jurisdiction to treat
paired foreign entities as controlled foreign corporations owned by
their domestic counterparts, offers a superior alternative to section
269B. Not only does the Treasury Department's solution fulfill
Congress's objectives as successfully as section 269B, but it avoids
the serious pitfalls marring section 269B's approach to stapled
stock.
The difficulty of finding an alternative solution lies in the com-
plexity of the stapled stock problem. Traditional rules of tax juris-
diction suggest that a paired foreign corporation falls outside direct
United States tax jurisdiction.'8 5 However, the tax avoidance mo-
tives underlying typical distribution and pairing of a foreign corpo-
ration's stock, coupled with former ownership by a domestic
corporation, strongly suggest that stapled stock is a "transparent
device"' 8 6 designed solely to circumvent United States jurisdic-
tion. 18 7 Hence, an alternative solution to section 269B must strike a
fine balance between expanding the United States tax jurisdiction
and conforming with traditional standards ofjurisdiction and bilat-
eral tax treaties.
The Treasury Department's original legislative solution of
1980188 offers a general approach to stapled stock' 8 9 that avoids
many of the more serious pitfalls presented by section 269B. 190
Under the proposal, the Internal Revenue Service regards pairing a
181 See supra note 2. Most stapled stock schemes designed to avoid United States
taxes utilize tax havens. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
182 See supra notes 21, 111 and accompanying text.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
184 See Gordon, supra note 91, at 32. The use of tax havens as measured by United
States investments grew rapidly from $4.7 billion in 1968 to $23 billion in 1978 accord-
ing to Commerce Department figures. Id.
185 See supra notes 39-40, 81-90 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
188 H.R. 8110, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 25,411 (1980); see supra notes
91-102 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 140-84 and accompanying text.
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foreign corporation's stock with its former domestic parent as a can-
cellation of a distribution of the foreign corporation's stock owner-
ship to the domestic corporation's shareholders. o19 Because the
distribution of the foreign corporation's stock no longer creates a
newly independent entity, the domestic corporation remains the
beneficial owner of the foreign corporation. Thus, under subpart F,
the domestic corporation becomes a United States shareholder of a
controlled foreign corporation. 92
This alternative solves the problems Congress hoped to resolve
with section 269B. First, the alternative cures pre-section 269B am-
biguitiesI93 in the tax treatment of a distribution and pairing.' 94
Second, by requiring that the domestic corporation pay United
States taxes on the paired foreign entity's earnings under subpart
F,195 the alternative eliminates incentives for the domestic corpora-
tion to undercharge its foreign counterpart for goods and services
as a means of transferring the domestic corporation's profits
abroad. 196 Third, by extending indirect tax jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, the alternative allows the Internal Revenue Service to
police the compliance of paired foreign corporations with the anti-
boycott rules and other regulatory measures enforced, 97 in part,
through the Code.198 Fourth, it ends the abusive use of stapled
stock as a "transparent device" that threatens to undermine the in-
tegrity of the tax system.' 99
Because the alternative solution uses a domestic corporation to
tax indirectly a foreign paired entity, the alternative avoids the juris-
dictional problems posed by section 269B, 200 and does not require
unilateral modification of tax treaties. 2 1 Moreover, it avoids section
269B's overbreadth problems. 20 2 The alternative solution equalizes
the tax treatment of paired foreign entities with controlled foreign
corporations, and, by focusing on the distribution of a foreign cor-
poration's stock by domestic parents, ignores pairings that involve
domestic corporations and former foreign parents.
The drawbacks of the alternative solution do not outweigh pro-
spective increases in revenue. Admittedly the alternative leads to
191 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 98-102, 135-39 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
198 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
199 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 166-84 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent tax treatment between the distribution and pairing of a
domestic corporation and a foreign corporation. In the former, the
IRS requires the shareholders to recognize the distribution as a tax-
able event, and in the latter it claims the pairing arrangement
cancels the effective distribution. However, such inconsistency is
justified because the two pairing arrangements differ to the extent
that one ends in a tax avoidance and the other does not. A second
problem with the alternative is that the domestic corporation must
pay taxes on income earned and distributed by a foreign corpora-
tion that theoretically lies beyond its control. However, the congru-
ence of ownership between the two foreign corporations greatly
reduces the injustice of such treatment. Indeed, many other provi-
sions of the Code employ constructive receipt to tax income a tax-
payer may never have actually received.203
CONCLUSION
Congress acted properly to dose the tax loophole exploited by
stapled stock. However, section 269B's expansion of United States
tax jurisdiction to reach directly foreign paired entities fails to con-
form with traditional standards of United States and international
tax jurisdiction. The new rule does not discriminate between pair-
ing arrangements that remove a foreign corporation from United
States tax jurisdiction and pairings in which the foreign corporation
originally rested beyond United States tax jurisdiction. Moreover,
the Code now taxes foreign paired entities more harshly than simi-
larly controlled foreign corporations. Finally, because section 269B
permits the United States unilaterally to override bilateral tax trea-
ties, it jeopardizes the viability of future tax treaties and the contin-
ued cooperative enforcement of treaties by current treaty partners.
Congress could better achieve its objectives by equating the
treatment of foreign paired entities with controlled foreign corpora-
tions. Under this alternative approach, the IRS would ignore the
distribution of a foreign corporation's ownership by a domestic cor-
poration when coupled with a pairing, and continue to treat the do-
mestic corporation as the owner of a controlled foreign corporation.
ChristopherJ. Lord
203 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (constructive receipt); Corry, supra note 38, at 193.
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